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FACTS 
The Decree awarded the assets of the marriage as set 
forth in Defendant's statement of Facts, adding only 
Defendant's retirement account to his side of the ledger (R 
238 L.16 - 17) . 
Plaintiff came to the marriage unskilled and with minor 
children for whom she received support from Social Security, 
their natural father being deceased. She concentrated her 
efforts on homemaking because Defendant preferred that she 
remain home. When the marriage began to disintegrate, 
Plaintiff sought employment but was able to find only low 
paying employment. She terminated several jobs due to health 
problems and because of Defendant's preference that she 
remain home (R 174 L.13 to L.21; R 178 L.3 - R 178 A L.8; R 
204 L.ll - L.19; R 214 L.9 - L.ll). 
At the time of trial Plaintiff was not employed, as she 
could not find suitable work. She is capable of employment, 
but has difficulty finding a job, due to her age and lack of 
skills. Defendant's net income was $2,325.00 per month 
(R.lll Findings # 5 ) . 
After the parties married, Plaintiff and Defendant 
pooled their resources and incomes to purchase equipment so 
that Defendant could become self employed. Subsequently, 
they moved to the house in Magna, and, using capital earned 
from the business during the marriage, their personal labor 
and the labor of Plaintiff's relatives, they built an 
oversized garage to house the business equipment and made 
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other improvements (R 180 L.5 - L . 1 8 ) . 
Prior to purchasing the Magna home in December 1975, 
the parties resided in a home in Kearns. This home was 
purchased by Defendant prior to the marriage, however, 
during the marriage, both contributed their incomes to 
upkeep, improvement and mortgage payments (RP 172 L.19 - P. 
174 L.6; RP 174 L.22 R 175 L.21, R 200, L.ll - L . 2 1 ) . 
Defendant produced no evidence at the time of trial 
concerning the value of the home at the time of his marriage 
to Plaint iff. 
Defendant produced a letter from his doctor stating 
that he might require further surgery on his knee in the 
indefinite future; Defendant testified that he continues to 
drive truck and even to work overtime (R 221 L.l - L.10) 
D e f e n d a n t s actual disability is questionable. (R 205 L.18 -
P.206 L.5; R 209 L.l - L.6) . 
Proceeds of Defendant's personal injury award were 
co-mingled with other assets of the marriage, i.e., a 
portion was used to pay family expenses and the balance, 
$50,000.00, was placed in certificates in the joint names of 
the parties for their future needs (R 217 L.9 - L . 1 4 ) . The 
parties continued to live together, share the same living 
quarters, and operate on joint finances during the pendency 
of the divorce proceedings. Even after the divorce was 
filed, Defendant took no action to limit Plaintiff's access 
to any funds . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff submits that the trial court properly 
considered both the law and the equities in it's order. 
Plaintiff, a 49 year old woman, long out of the job market 
and without marketable skills, was properly awarded 
possession of the home, approximately half the fixed assets 
of the marriage, and alimony. 
Defendant, a self employed small businessman with 
substantial income, was properly awarded approximately half 
the fixed assets and the means to continue producing income. 
As to the Kearns home and personal injury settlement, 
the Court properly found their values, based upon the 
evidence, or lack of evidence before it, and the conduct of 
the parties in relation thereto. 
The order is proper, based upon the circumstances of 
the parties at the time of trial; the Court cannot guess 
what might happen in the future but retains the power to 
make such modifications as circumstances require. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DIVISION OF THE PERSONAL INJURY 
AWARD IS SUPPORTED BY EQUITY AND IS NOT PROHIBITED BY LAW 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the trial court 
has equity powers to assure that the welfare of the parties 
is best served. The trial court can take into consideration 
all the pertinent circumstances, including separate property 
or property derived from outside the marriage, even if 
acquired after entry of the decree of divorce, in making its 
3 
award. Wilkins -vs- Stout, 588 Pac 2d 1*5 (1978) 
The court's findings in this case support the Decree. 
The court clearly indicated that it considered the source 
and existance of the certificates derived from the personal 
injury award, and took into account the parties 1 employment 
histories, current income, and disposition of other assets 
(R 236 L.13 - R237 L.4) 
It is well established that the trial court has broad 
discretion in adjusting financial and property interests. A 
party challenging the trial court's distribution has the 
burden to prove a misunderstanding or misapplication of the 
law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, or that 
the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings, or 
a serious inequity has occured. English -vs- English, 565 
Pac 2d 409 (1977), Pope -vs- Pope 589 Pac 2d 752 (1978), 
3esperson -vs- Jesperson 610 Pac 2d 326 (1980) the Utah 
Supreme Court, in each of the cases cited, has upheld a 
trial court's disposition of marital assets awarding one 
spouse a higher dollar figure in fixed assets, particularly 
when the other spouse, as in this case, is awarded the means 
by which to generate additional funds. 
The award received in Defendant's personal injury case 
is not differentiated as to the portion attributable to 
future (and speculative) surgical expense, which portion is 
applicable to lost income, and which to general damages for 
pain and suffering (R 240 L.3 - 17; R 111) the discussion 
contained in Amato -vs- Amato, 434 A 2d 642 (NJ 1981) is not 
4 
dispositive of the applicable burden of proof, which 
presents as a question of first impression to this court, 
and is offset by this court's decision*in Izat t -vs- Izat t, 
627 Pac 2d 49 (1981) recognizing that separate assets are 
properly considered in dividing the parties1 joint assets. 
It is appropriate to award Plaintiff an interest in 
funds applicable to earnings, past, present and future, in 
this 16 year marriage, particularly as she was awarded 
alimony for an indefinite term. 
In Izat t -vs- Izat t supra, the Court stated, 
"Consistent with those statutes (30-2-1 and 30-2-4 
U C A ) , the fact that the $97,000.00 belongs to Defendant is 
not to be doubted. Nevertheless, the fact that she posesses 
that asset is one of th total circumstances the court could 
consider in making what he regards as a just and practical 
allocation of the property and finances of the parties." 
(page 51) 
Plaintiff notes that the text of the statutes relied 
upon in Izat t, supra, are inapposite to the Defendant's 
claim herein. These statutes speak to liability for debts of 
the spouse, and the wifes right to bring an action, in her 
own name, to collect damages. 
the trial court in Izat t, supra, did take the personal 
injury award into consideration in awarding the wife less 
than half the equity in the home of the parties, and no 
alimony, even though the parties had been married 16 years 
and the wife was disabled, and was in fact under 
guardiansh i p. 
Defendant concedes that he contributed $11,459.45 to 
the marriage (Appellant's Brief page 8 ) , but asserts that 
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the balance, approximately $50,000.00, should be awarded to 
him as his separate property, in addition to a portion of 
all other marital assets. 
Defendant put those funds in joint certificates. This 
appears to evidence an intent to share those funds with 
Plaintiff. Defendant assumes that the court is bound to 
award each party a fixed percentage of the marital assets. 
This assumption is contrary to law; and ignores the trial 
court's distribution, which gives Defendant a greater share 
of the marital assets, effectively compensating for 
inclusion of assets traceable to the injury award in the 
distribution Jesper son, supra, Eng1i sh, supra, Pope, supra 
(R 240 L.3 - 17) 
Defendant was awarded cash assets, consisting of 
certificates and separate savings having a total value of 
approximately $46,000.00. This is more than adequate to meet 
his speculative "need" for funds to cover prospective 
medical expenses. 
The Court, in short, properly divided the assets of the 
parties, even allowing for the personal injury award. If 
there was an error, it was harmless; but in light of the 
equities, there was no error. 
Defendant's contention that he was prejudiced, or that 
the property division was "punitive" is not supported by the 
facts of this case. The Court properly distributed the 
assets of the marriage taking those funds into account, when 
considered with all other facts and circumstances. 
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I K THE TRIAL COURT fS AWARD OF ALIMONY IS PROPER 
Defendant objects to the award of alimony and appears 
to argue that Plaintiff should be forced to obtain 
employment. This position fails to take into account the 
limited employment opportunities available to a woman 49 
years of age, with ulcers and minimal skills, or the years 
she spent away from the job market tending to the needs of 
the parties and performing the support services necessary to 
permit Defendant to operate their business. 
There is no basis for Defendants claim that the award 
of alimony is punitive in any way; the record does not 
support such a contention. Rather, the Defendant argues that 
Plaintiff should be penalized for her unemployment at the 
time of trial. Defendant forgets that it was at his own 
insistance that Plaintiff was unemployed during the majority 
of the marriage. If the parties had remained married, 
Plaintiff would have had no greater incentive to find 
employment than she does now. 
Plaintiff further notes that the alimony awarded is 
approximately one-third of Defendant's net income, and 
submits that this is a reasonable allocation of resources. 
While it is possible that the Defendant's income may 
decrease, it is likewise possible that it may increase. 
Further, it is likely that the Defendant will find other 
sources of income should his health fail, i.e. leasing out 
his equipment, or working as a mechanic. (R 222 L.16 - L.25) 
Plaintiff submits that it is not reasonable that 
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Defendant receive a windfall reduction of his support 
obligation during the period when he clearly has the 
necessary resources with which to pay the award. He is not 
in need of those resources now, but the Plaintiff is, and 
does not have the income or means of producing income 
available to the Defendant. (R 111, Findings #5 and 6) 
Additionally, Defendant receives a benefit from his payment 
of alimony, in that a portion of those funds are used to 
maintain the mortgage obligation on the home of the parties, 
and as a tax deduction. 
This Court has recognized the disadvantaged position of 
the older woman, in reviewing an award of alimony in a case 
with similar facts. Jones v. 3ones, 700 Pac 2d 1072 (1985) 
It is entirely unrealistic to assume that a woman in 
her mid 50 !s with no substantial work experience or 
training will be able to enter the job market and 
support herself in anything resembling the style 
in which the couple had been living, (page 1075) 
Additionally, the income available to Plaintiff from the 
Whiteman-Clark contract is uncertain (R 234 L.18 - R 235 
L.3) and the National Military Underwriters stock produces 
no income. (R 206 L.6 - 7) 
The principles enunciated in Frank v. Frank, 585 Pac 
2d 453 (1973) are applicable to this case. This is a 
marriage of long duration, Plaintiff assisted Defendant 
during the lean years by helping him to begin his trucking 
business, and there exists a current disparity in the 
parties1 earning potential. These facts and circumstances 
clearly support the Court's award of alimony. Where there 
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are sufficient resources to meet both parties1 basic living 
expenses, there is no justification for reducing Plaintiff's 
income below the level of her expenses. 
Defendant's argument that Plaintiff should be forced 
into the job market so she can later collect social security 
was made both at the time of trial and at the time of the 
Defendant's post Decree motion. There is no evidence in the 
record to shown whether Plaintiff has already accrued 
sufficient quarters to qualify her to receive social 
security. The argument might as well be made that Defendant 
pay no alimony so that his support burden can immediately 
be borne by the welfare system of this state. Plaintiff's 
time, efforts and resources during the 16 years of the 
marriage was invested in the joint enterprises of the 
parties' marriage, home and business. She is entitled to 
receive a just return for that investment. It is precisely 
that investment which now makes her unable to compete 
effectively in the marketplace. 
The trial court properly noted that an award of alimony 
is subject to change, upon a showing of substantial change 
in the circumstances of the parties. (R 2 40 L.12 - 17) The 
trial court must, however, rely upon the current 
circumstances of the parties in making it's award. 
Defendant largely bases his objection to the award on 
an event i.e. loss of health, which may occur at any time 
during an eight year span, or not at all. (Letter of Dr. 
H o m e , Defendant's Exhibit 22) This prognosis does not rise 
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to a "probabi1ity . . . too great for the court to "content 
itself with the circumstances as they now exist". 
(Appellant's Brief p 21) Indeed, by Defendant's own 
testimony, he chooses to work overtime, and did so before 
the divorce; the Decree herein does not place that burden 
upon him. Nor is there any evidence in the record that 
Defendant's knee would be benefited by shorter working 
hour s . 
An alimony award should, as far as possible, equalize 
the parties' respective standards of living and maintain 
them at a level as close a possible to the standard of 
living enjoyed during the marriage. In determining the 
amount of alimony to be awarded, it is necessary for the 
trial court to consider the financial condition and needs of 
the Plaintiff, her ability to produce a sufficient income 
for herself, and the ability of the Defendant to provide 
support. Olsen v. Ol sen , 15 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (August 1985). 
The trial court in this case considered each of these 
factors before making it's award. (R 111 Findings #5,6,7) 
Defendant's claim that he plans to divert additional 
monies to acquisition of capital assets for the business, 
i.e. new equipment, is not binding on the Cour t. Jones v. 
Jones , 700 Pac 2d 1072 
The apportionment of income between personal and 
business uses is quite properly a matter left to the 
discretion of the husband asowner of the pharmacy and 
gift shop. However, how he chooses to allocate that 
profit is not binding on the court in determining his 
ability to pay alimony to his ex-spouse. The full 
profit produced by the business, adjusted by the court 
to take into account legitimate and reasonable needs of 
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the business for additional capital, should have been 
used as the basis for assessing the husband's ability 
to provide for his spouse. In making this analysis, the 
trial court should not permit all claims of need for 
capital on the part of the business to take precedence 
over the support needs of the wife. If these capital 
needs are a result of discretionary decisions of the 
husband to expand and improve the business, rather than 
to maintain it in it1 present condition, then to permit 
him to divert income into the business at the expense 
of his ex-spouse's support needs would be to permit him 
to enrich himself at her expense, page 1076 
The trial court made it's determination on the issue of 
alimony after a full trial of the issues, and further 
considered the issues and arguments raised herein on 
Defendant's post decree motion. It's judgment should be 
given the greatest deference. Dogu v. D O R U 652 Pac 2d 1308 
(1982),DeRose v. DeRose, 19 Utah 2d 77, 426 Pac 2d 221 
(1967). 
The case at bar does not present the type of situation 
which the Court was compelled to remedy in Dogu, supra. The 
relief sought by Defendant in this case is not structured to 
protect Plaintiff's entitlement to future income, and can 
serve only to place her in a position of hardship contrary 
to the law's mandate to "equalize the parties' respective 
standards of living and maintain them at levels as close as 
possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the 
mar r iage".Olsen, supra, DeRose, supra Defendant proposes 
that he improve his standard of living at the expense of the 
Plaintiff, by significantly reducing her standard of living, 
so as to shift the burden of her support from himself to 
third parties. This position is contrary to the case law 
produced by this court, common principles of equity and 
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public policy. Eng1i sh, supra, Frank, supra. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO TRACE THE EQUITY IN 
THE KEARNS HOME 
Defendant claims that he should be awarded restitution 
for the equity in a home purchased by him prior to the 
mar r iage . 
Defendant produced no evidence of the value of the 
Kearns home at the time of his marriage to Plaintiff, and 
the testimony of the parties differed as to their 
contributions to it!s value. (R 227 L.ll - R 229 L.16) The 
trial court declined to speculate as to what that evidence 
might have been, or to apply the arbitrary computation 
suggested by the Defendant. It is not possible to compute 
the equity at the time of the marriage based upon the 
information in the record. Defendant failed to carry his 
burden of proof, leaving the trial court with no basis for 
awarding him a dollar value of equity in the Kearns home. 
The cases upon which Defendant relies do not support 
his contention that it is more desirable to approximate 
rather than to make no determination at all. The cases cited 
are based upon contract law, and rely upon principles not 
responsive to the equities of domestic cases. The trial 
court recognized this in it's statement that the parties had 
pooled their assets. (R 236 L.20 - R 237 L.9) This finding 
is supported by the conduct of the parties during the 
marriage, such as their sharing of resources, holding assets 
jointly, etc. The record does not show that Defendant made 
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any attempt to segregate the property. 
In this case, the Plaintiff contributed her separate 
resources, to wit, the social security income she received 
for her children, and her labor, in improving the property. 
She also made substantial contributions to the property in 
Magna, i.e. the labor contributed by herself and her family 
in improving that property, which should equitably be 
considered in determining the proper distribution of assets. 
The courts of this state have not stated an invariable 
rule that a party recover the property brought to the 
marriage; equity may require a different result. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the property was validly 
conveyed to the husband prior to the marriage, it does 
not follow that it must be awarded solely to him in a 
property settlment, especially where the wife has used 
her separate resources to purchase the property from 
the husband's mother and to clear pending 1i ens.Workman 
v. Workman, 652 Pac 2d 931 (1982) at 933 
The Plaintiff is this case contributed her separate assets 
to the marriage and contributed to an increase in the value 
of the Kearns property. It is reasonable, and no abuse of 
discretion, that the proceeds of that property be deemed to 
be merged in the marriage. 
IV. THE COURT PROPERLY DIVIDED THE NATIONAL MILITARY 
UNDERWRITER'S STOCK BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
Defendant submits no case law to support the 
proposition that all the stock should be awarded to 
Plaintiff and the property distribution rearranged 
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accordingly. This distribution is properly founded in the 
discretion of the trial court and should not be disturbed. 
The present distribution equalizes the risk of loss and 
the hope of profit, thereby insulating both parties and 
equalizing the values awarded to each. Plaintiff notes that 
each party received $16,200.00 worth of stock, not 
$32,400.00. 
Plaintiff submits that the trial court did not err, nor 
abuse it's discretion in dividing the stock between the 
parties. The trial court's discretion in adjusting the 
financial and property interests is not lightly set aside on 
appeal. Engli sh, supra. 
V. THE MAGNA HOME WAS PROPERLY AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF 
The Magna home was acquired during the marriage and 
occupied jointly until the time of the divorce. The parties 
improved the property, using their joint income and their 
own labor and that of Plaintiff's relatives. 
Defendant, with a net income of $2300+ per month, is 
well able to obtain other lodgings for himself, as well as 
shop space. Defendant produced no testimony concerning the 
cost of replacement shop space, nor is there evidence 
concerning availability of such space. (Findings #9) 
So long as Plaintiff remains in the home and is 
obligated to pay the mortgage obligation, Defendant has an 
incentive to pay the alimony award; that incentive would 
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disappear if Defendant were awarded the home. 
Plaintiff occupies the home full time; Defendant is 
frequently absent for extended periods while driving out of 
town and out of state. It is not efficient for the home to 
stand empty during those periods of time. 
Defendant argues that he should be awarded immediate 
use and possession of the home, speculating that Plaintiff 
will be required to sell when Defendant's equity becomes 
due. Sale of the home is not inevitable. Plaintiff may elect 
to purchase Defendant's interest, which would result in no 
net loss to her, only a change in the form of her assets. 
Defendant also asserts that it may be difficult to sell 
the home, because of the presence of the garage facility on 
the property. Plaintiff submits that this facility may, in 
fact, make the home uniquely attractive to other self 
employed truckers. Again, Defendant's argument assumes that 
the home must be sold. 
Defendant also asserts that his equity in the home is 
greater that Plaintiff's, but fails to support this 
assertion. 
Plaintiff submits that the trial court's decision to 
award her possession of the Magna home is responsive to her 
emotional investment in the home, as a housewife, her lesser 
income and earning potential and her full time use of the 
premises, as opposed to Defendant's parttime occupancy. 
Plaintiff's occupancy of the home also acts as an incentive 
to payment of alimony. Though this is not a reason expressed 
15 
by the trial court, it is a relevant consideration. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT'S DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS SHOULD NOT BE 
DISTURBED 
The trial court's ruling is adequately and 
appropriately supported by the Findings and record in this 
case. When a specific Finding is not made, the reviewing 
court turns to the record to determine whether there is an 
adequate basis for the order. Pennington v. Pennington, 16 
Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (August 1985) 
The trial court in this case carefully tailored the 
property division to the needs of the parties, taking into 
account their personal and financial resources (R 240 L.3 -
L.17) . 
Defendant seeks to substitute his judgment for that of 
the trial court, suggesting a distribution which is far more 
advantageous to him than to Plaintiff. He would award her 
only fixed assets consisting of personal loans to family 
members largely unable to repay (R P.184 L.15 - P.185 L.5; R 
215 L.2 - L.14), proceeds of a contract already in default 
(R 234 L.18 - R235 L.14), non-income producing stock (R 206 
L.6 - L.7) and no cash. Defendant proposes to reserve for 
himself all the cash assets of the parties, the income 
producing business assets and all the equity in the home. 
Defendant, in other words, proposes to provide himself with 
a reliable means of producing income, but to strip Plaintiff 
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of the resources she will need to establish an income and 
provide for her own security. He proposes to pay no, or 
token, alimony after a marriage of 16 years in which the 
joint efforts of the parties produced substantial assets, 
retaining all of the fruit so their joint labors and 
requiring Plaintiff to seek assistance from third parties 
for her basic needs. 
The authority cited by Defendant to support his 
assertion that the trial court must build provisions for the 
future into the decree is colorful, it does not support 
Defendant's theory. Defendant must bring an action for 
modification at the proper time, and only after a change has 
occured . 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff submits that the Decree herein is proper, 
based upon the evidence before the trial court and the 
circumstances of the parties. 
The trial court, nor this Court, is bound to strictly 
divide the assets acquired during the marriage according to 
any fixed rules; the division must be responsive to equity 
and the needs of the parties. The Decree in this case 
reflects the trial court's careful consideratin of all 
relevant factors, and should be given great deference. 
Graziano -vs- Graziano. 321 Pac 2d 931 (1958) 
Defendant has failed to produce any persuasive 
authority to support his arguments that he should receive 
17 
sole credit for the personal injury award and the entire 
equity in the homes. The property division he proposes is 
inequitable and unjust. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the order below 
be affirmed and that she be awarded her costs and a 
reaonable attorney fee. , 
DATED this / { day of / / A ^ ^ j J ^ ^ ^ 1985. 
Kathryn Schuler Denholm 
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